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New Trend and Future Direction of Nuclear Disarmament
Mitsuru KUROSAWA*
Abstract
The purpose of this article is to examine the new trend of nuclear disarmament
mainly spurred by President Obama’s Prague address for a world without nuclear
weapons, and to seek the future direction of nuclear disarmament in order to
achieve a more peaceful and secure international community.  I will examine some
proposals that were submitted or decided prior to the Review Conference of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in May 2010 as well as many proposals submitted
at the conference, and then I will examine the content of the final document in
detail.  Finally, I will try to show what kinds of actions should be taken soon in
order to implement the undertakings in the final document as a process toward
achieving a world without nuclear weapons.
I.  Introduction
President Barak Obama’s famous address in Prague in April 2009 was a turning
point for the trend of nuclear disarmament, which had been dormant during the
Bush administration.  President Obama stated that the United States has a moral
responsibility to act for nuclear disarmament.  This profoundly changed the
circumstances surrounding nuclear disarmament and created a very positive
orientation toward it.
Before this, there had been two noteworthy proposals for nuclear disarmament.
One was the proposal for a world free of nuclear weapons by George Schulz,
William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn in January 2007, which decidedly
affected President Obama’s nuclear policy.  The other was the five-point proposal
made by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in October 2008.  He asked the
nuclear-weapon states to fulfill their obligation for nuclear disarmament by
negotiating a nuclear weapons convention.
In September 2009, the historic first summit meeting focusing on nuclear non-
proliferation and disarmament was held at the UN Security Council on an initiative
by President Obama.  Participants discussed nuclear non-proliferation and
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disarmament and unanimously adopted resolution 1887.
The International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
(ICNND) co-sponsored by the Australian and Japanese governments submitted its
comprehensive report, “Eliminating Nuclear Threat: A Practical Agenda for Global
Policymakers” in December 2009.  One of the main purposes of this report was to
make clear and concrete proposals to the 2010 NPT review conference.
The Obama administration submitted the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Report
on April 6, 2010, which is radically different from the previous report issued under
President Bush, and provides for reducing the role and number of nuclear weapons,
not developing new nuclear warheads, and not carrying out nuclear testing.  It also
promises not to use nuclear weapons on a non-nuclear-weapon state which is a
party to NPT and adheres to its obligations.
On April 8, 2010, the United States and the Russian Federation signed the New
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which will reduce the number of
deployed nuclear warheads of each state to 1550 in seven years.  The treaty also
limits its delivery vehicles to 700 deployed and 800 deployed and undeployed ones.
It symbolizes a new relationship between the two nations, resetting their relations
from confrontation to cooperation.
President Obama invited 46 heads of states or governments to the Washington
Nuclear Security Summit on April 12 and 13, 2010, mainly to discuss ways to
prevent nuclear terrorism.  They joined President Obama’s call to secure all
vulnerable nuclear material within four years, and reaffirmed the fundamental
responsibility of states to maintain effective security of all nuclear material and to
prevent non-state actors from obtaining information or technology required to use
such material for malicious purposes.
These events were the background for the NPT review conference, which was
held from May 2 to 28, 2010 at the headquarters of the United Nations in New
York.  The conference focused on many issues concerning nuclear disarmament,
nuclear non-proliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and it ended with
the successful adoption of a final document.  The final document, which includes
64 action plans for these issues, was adopted by consensus.
II.  Toward a World without Nuclear Weapons
A World without Nuclear Weapons
President Barak Obama, in Prague in April 2009, stated “as a nuclear power – as
the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon – the United States has a
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moral responsibility to act,” and he stated clearly and with conviction America’s
commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.1)
The origin of this famous address dates back to January 2007, when George
Schulz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn proposed “A World Free of
Nuclear Weapons,” asking the U.S. to work energetically on the actions required to
achieve that goal.2)
The first UN Security Council summit focused on nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament, held in September 2009 with the initiative of President Obama,
unanimously adopted Security Council resolution 1887 (2009).  Under its first
preambular paragraph, the Security Council resolves to seek a safer world for all
and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons.
The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review Report3) published on April 8, 2010 expressed
the nature of the report, stating this Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) report outlines
the Administration’s approach to promoting the President’s agenda for reducing
nuclear dangers and pursuing the goal of a world without nuclear weapons.
The Japanese government strongly supports this idea, as Prime Ministers Yukio
Hatoyama and Naoto Kan and Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada explained on some
occasions.  Under the U.S.-Japan Joint Statement toward a World without Nuclear
Weapons4) issued on November 13, 2009, the two states welcome the renewed
international attention and commitment to achieve the peace and security of a world
without nuclear weapons and confirm their determination to realize such a world.
At the 2010 NPT review conference many states referred to this idea favorably.
Japan’s statement at the general debates also included the reference to a world
without nuclear weapons.5)  The NAC (New Agenda Coalition) made a proposal “to
1) The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Barak Obama,”
Czech Republic, April 5, 2009, accessed April 6, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the_press_office/remarks-By-President-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/.
2) George Schulz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear
Weapons,” The Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007, accessed January 6, 2007, http://
www.fcnl.org/issues/item.php?item_id=2251&issue_id=54.
3) United States Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report (2010): 1, accessed
April 30, 2010, http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review
%20Report.pdf.
4) The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “United States-Japan Joint Statement
toward a World without Nuclear Weapons,” November 13, 2009, accessed November 14,
2009, http://geneva.usmission.gov/2009/11/15/us-japan-joint-statement/.
5) Statement by Japan, General Debate, May 4, 2010. Statements and Documents of the 2010
NPT Review Conference are available in the following sites. “2010 Review Conference of
the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 3-28 May
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call upon all states parties to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the
objective of achieving a world free from nuclear weapons.6)”  The NAM (Non-
Aligned Movement) states also explained that “The realization of the objective of a
peaceful world free from nuclear weapons is the NAM states parties’ highest
priority.7)”
The final document of the review conference8) states that “the conference
resolves to seek a safer world for all and to achieve the peace and security of a
world without nuclear weapons” and recommends under Action 1 that “All states
parties commit to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the
objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.”
The concept of a world without nuclear weapons had never been used before in
an official statement at this kind of conference, but it is now widely accepted
mainly because of strong advocacy by President Obama.  Indeed, the concept
should be welcomed and is very useful to encourage states to make efforts to
achieve complete disarmament, taking concrete measures toward a world without
nuclear weapons.
However, we must remember the following words of President Obama at
Prague.  He said, “I’m not naïve.  This goal will not be reached quickly – perhaps
not in my lifetime…Make no mistake: As long as these weapons exist, the United
States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary and
guarantee that defense to our allies.”
Nuclear Weapons Convention
The idea of a nuclear weapons convention was recommended by UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon in his five-point proposal in October 2008.  He urged the
nuclear-weapon states to fulfill their obligation under the Treaty to undertake
negotiations on effective measures leading to nuclear disarmament, stating “They
could pursue this goal by agreement on a framework of separate, mutually
reinforcing instruments.  Or they could consider negotiating a nuclear-weapon
2010,”  http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/. “Reaching Critical Will,” http://www.reaching
criticalwill.org/legal/npt/revcon2010.html.
6) NPT/CONF.2010/WP.8 by the New Agenda Coalition, March 23, 2010.
7) Statement by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), General Debate,
May 3, 2010.
8) “2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, Final Document (NPT/CONF.2010/50(Vol.1)),” (New York, 2010), accessed June
10, 2010, http://www.un.org/ga/seach/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/Conf.2010/50(VOL.1).
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convention, backed by a strong system of verification.9)”
The International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament
(ICNND) sponsored by the Japanese and Australian governments submitted a
report10) in November 2009 and recommended that “Work should commence now
on further refining and developing the concept in the model Nuclear Weapons
Convention now in circulation, making its provisions as workable and realistic as
possible and building support for them, with the objective of having a fully-worked
through draft available to inform and guide multilateral disarmament negotiations.”
At the review conference, the NAM states demanded “to agree on an action plan
on nuclear disarmament which includes concrete steps for the total elimination of
nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time including a nuclear weapons
convention, without delay,11)” and submitted “Elements for a Plan of Action for the
Elimination of Nuclear Weapons,12)” which provided for a three-phased plan to
eliminate nuclear weapons by 2025.
China demanded that “The international community should develop, at an
appropriate time, a viable, long-term plan composed of phased actions, including
conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons.13)”
The concept of a nuclear weapons convention was supported not only by the non-
aligned states and China but also by Switzerland, Austria and Norway.
The nuclear-weapon states excluding China generally opposed the idea, with the
U.S. stating, “The United States does not share that view.  A Nuclear Weapons
Convention is not achievable in the near term and therefore is not a realistic
alternative to the step-by-step approach we are taking.14)”  Japan does not support
the idea because Japan traditionally prefers a practical, step-by-step approach.
The final document, in the context of making efforts to establish the necessary
framework to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons, states that
“The Conference notes the Five-Point Proposal for Nuclear Disarmament of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, which proposes inter alia consideration of
9) “UN Secretary-General’s Address to East-West Institute, Secretary-General, SG/SM/
11881,” October 24, 2008, accessed January 17, 2009, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/
2008/sgsm11811.doc.htm.
10) Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi, Eliminating Nuclear Threat: A Practical Agenda for
Global Policymakers (Report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation
and Disarmament, Canberra/Tokyo, November 2009).
11) NPT/CONF.2010/WP.46 by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties, April 28, 2010.
12) NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47 by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties, April 28, 2010.
13) Statement by China, General Debate, May 4, 2010.
14) Statement by the United States, Subsidiary Body I, May 10, 2010.
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negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention or agreement on a framework of
separate mutually reinforcing instruments, backed by a strong system of
verification.”
This is the first time that a nuclear weapons convention was referred to in the
final document, although its reference is indirect.  The idea of a nuclear weapons
convention has been advocated by non-aligned states and NGOs (non-governmental
organizations), and some NGOs submitted a draft nuclear weapons convention.15)
Time Framework for Nuclear Disarmament
The ICNND proposed that “Nuclear disarmament should be pursued as a two-
phase process: with “minimization” to be achieved no later than 2015, and
“elimination” as soon as possible thereafter.  Short (to 2012), medium (to 2025) and
longer term (beyond 2025) action agendas should reflect those objectives. The main
measures that should be taken to achieve minimization point are 1) reduction to no
more than 2000 nuclear warheads, 2) commitment to no first use of nuclear
weapons, and 3) credible force postures.
The NAM proposal for nuclear disarmament provided for a strict time
framework in three phases of five years each, with completion by 2025.  The NAC
argued that “The Review Conference should call for a timeframe with the list of
specific actions for the implementation of Article VI,…It is vital that the
international community to adopt an action plan with benchmarks and timeframe
for the “how” to realize the objective of a world free of nuclear weapons.”  China
also proposed that the international community develop a viable, long-term plan
composed of phased actions.
However, the nuclear-weapon states excluding China are generally negative to
the idea of a time framework because they do not like to be bound by a strict
timeline.  Japan as well as the U.S. does not support the idea of a time framework
for nuclear disarmament because it prefers practical and incremental steps in
nuclear disarmament.
According to the first draft at the conference, the nuclear-weapon states shall
convene consultations not later than 2011 to accelerate concrete progress on nuclear
disarmament and shall report back to states parties in 2012, and based on the
outcome of these consultations, the Secretary-General of the United Nations is
15) The latest version of a model nuclear weapons convention is included in Securing our
Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, International Association of
Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms, International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against
Proliferation, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, (2007).
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invited to convene an international conference in 2014 to consider ways and means
to agree on a roadmap for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a
specified timeframe.
Because these draft sentences were deleted due to opposition by the nuclear
powers, it was instead agreed that “The nuclear-weapon states are called upon to
report the above undertakings to the Preparatory Committee at 2014.  The 2015
Review Conference will take stock and consider the next steps for the full
implementation of Article VI.”  The final document includes such a very weak
timeframe, as it was watered down significantly from the first draft.
A timeline or timeframe was one of the most confrontational issues at the
conference.  In the review section of the final document, which was composed by
the President of the Conference under his responsibility and did not reflect a
consensus opinion of the participants, paragraph 83 provides that “The conference
affirms that the final phase of the nuclear disarmament process and other related
measures should be pursued within an agreed legal framework, which a majority of
states parties believe should include specified timelines.”  This means there was no
consensus on specific timelines.
Regarding the issues of security assurances and the Fissile Material Cutoff
Treaty (FMCT), the first draft stated “If the discussions in the Conference on
Disarmament (CD) fail to commence before the end of the 2011 session of the
Conference on Disarmament, the 66th Session of the United Nations General
Assembly should determine how discussions should be pursued.”
This idea was also deleted due to the opposition from the nuclear-weapon states,
and only one sentence including time was included as follows, “The Review
Conference invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a high-
level meeting in September 2010 in support of the work of the Conference on
Disarmament.”
As the CD had not been working actively for more than 10 years, it was thought
to be a good idea for the UN General Assembly to determine how discussions
should be pursued.  As the possibility for the CD to start negotiations or
consultations seems very low, the final document should have indicated what to do
if the CD fails to start negotiations or consultations.
III.  Reduction of Nuclear Weapons
Reduction of Nuclear Weapons in General
The reduction of nuclear weapons is the surest way toward a world free of
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nuclear weapons.  President Obama was very positive about the idea of reducing
the number of nuclear weapons through an arms reduction treaty with Russia, as, in
particular, the START Treaty of 1991 was to expire in December 2009.  The U.S.
and Russia agreed to begin post-START negotiations in April 2009, and the New
START Treaty, which it had been hoped would be signed before the expiration of
the START Treaty, was signed on April 8, 2010.
The U.S. NPR submitted on April 6, 2010 states “The United States will meet
its commitment under Article VI of the NPT to pursue nuclear disarmament and
will make demonstrable progress over the next five to ten years.  We will work to
reduce the role and numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons while enhancing security for
ourselves, and our allies and partners.”
According to the report, the U.S. seeks ratification and implementation of the
New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) requiring substantial
reduction in deployed U.S. and Russian nuclear forces; engages Russia, after
ratification and entry into force of New START, in negotiations aimed at achieving
substantial further nuclear force reductions and transparency that would cover all
nuclear weapons – deployed and non-deployed, strategic and non-strategic; and
following substantial further nuclear force reductions with Russia, engages other
states possessing nuclear weapons, over time, in a multilateral effort to limit,
reduce, and eventually eliminate all nuclear weapons worldwide.
The ICNND states that “The “minimization point” objective should be to
achieve no later than 2025 a global total of no more than 2000 nuclear warheads,
with the U.S. and Russia reducing to a total of 500 nuclear warheads each.”  It
recommends for the START process that the U.S and Russia accelerate
implementation of the START follow-on treaty, which should be no later than
2015, and that once it is ratified, the two nations resume intensive negotiations with
a view to reaching a further START agreement no later than 2015, which could
bring the total number of warheads down to no more than 1000 for each, and
hopefully much less, by the year 2020.
It also indicates that the highest priority need is for all nuclear-armed states to
explicitly commit to not increasing the number of their nuclear weapons, that
strategic dialogues be initiated by all the nuclear-armed states to lay the
groundwork for multilateral disarmament negotiations, and that consideration be
given to using the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva as an appropriate forum
for initial consultations between all the nuclear-armed states.
The Australia-Japan joint package welcomed the nuclear disarmament steps
taken by France, Russia, the U.K., and the U.S. including the progress of
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negotiations for the START follow-on treaty, called on all states possessing nuclear
weapons to pursue negotiations on nuclear disarmament bilaterally and/or
multilaterally, and called on them to make an early commitment to reducing, or at
least not increasing their nuclear arsenals.16)  The NAC also called upon all nuclear-
weapon states to take further steps to reduce their non-strategic and strategic
nuclear arsenals.
The final document of the 2010 NPT review conference states that “the
Conference affirms the need for the nuclear-weapon states to reduce and eliminate
all types of their nuclear weapons,” and under Action 3, “the nuclear-weapon states
commit to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of
nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral,
bilateral, regional, and multilateral measures.”  The nuclear-weapon states are
called upon to rapidly moving towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile
of all types of nuclear weapons under Action 5a.
New START Treaty
On the new START treaty, Secretary of State Clinton mentioned that “we are
taking irreversible, transparent, verifiable steps to reduce the number of the nuclear
weapons in our arsenal.  Our new START treaty with Russia will limit the number
of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by our countries to levels not seen since the
1950s.  This agreement is consistent with the Secretary General’s call to pursue
nuclear disarmament through agreement on a framework of separate, mutually
reinforcing instruments.”
Russia also referred to the recent signing of the new START treaty, stating that
“As the President of Russia put it, in this new Treaty “both sides won, as they
strengthened their security and with regard of our victory the whole world
community has gained”.17)”
The U.S. and Russia submitted a Joint Statement on New START at the
conference, emphasizing its importance on the path to nuclear disarmament and
non-proliferation, demonstrating their commitment to Article VI, and stating that
the treaty is not only in the interests of our two countries, but of the entire world
community.18)
The five nuclear-weapon states expressed their support for the treaty, believing
16) NPT/CONF.2010/WP.9 by Australia and Japan, March 24, 2010.
17) Statement by the Russian Federation, General Debate, May 4, 2010.
18) Joint Statement by the Russian Federation and the United States of America on New
START, May 7, 2010.
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it to be a significant step in the implementation of Article VI that will promote
international stability and undiminished security for all, and thus help create the
conditions for moving toward our disarmament goals.19)
According to the NAM, the new START Treaty is a step in the right direction,
but such reductions remain below the international community’s expectations
which anticipate more concrete, uniform and systematic nuclear disarmament
efforts involving all nuclear weapon states.  The NAC welcomed the treaty and
looked forward to its early entry into force, stating that “This agreement is an
important step forward, but only one of many necessary steps needed to achieve
nuclear disarmament.”
Under Action 4, the U.S. and Russia commit to seeking the early entry into
force and full implementation of the New START Treaty and are encouraged to
continue discussions on follow-on measures.
Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons
Non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons are not mentioned separately in the
final document, although it is clear that they are substantively included, as the final
document refers to “all types of nuclear weapons”.  While the U.S. argued for
negotiations of non-strategic nuclear weapons with Russia,20) Russia opposed the
direct reference to non-strategic nuclear weapons, stating that the negotiations on
the reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons could be possible only within an
entire context including conventional arms and missile defense of the U.S.21)
Action 5b of the final document addresses the question of all nuclear weapons
regardless of their types or their location as an integral part of the general nuclear
disarmament.  In the first to third drafts, the main subject was the question of
weapons stationed on the territories of non-nuclear-weapon states.  With strong
opposition from the U.S., the phrase “regardless of their location” was inserted
instead, changing the substantive meaning of the provision.  In this connection,
Russia and China argued for the removal of nuclear weapons deployed in other
states, and non-aligned states argued that this nuclear sharing was a violation of
Articles I and II of the NPT.
The European Union (EU) called on all states parties possessing nuclear
19) Statement by the People’s Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America to the
2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, May 5, 2010.
20) Statement by the United States, Subsidiary Body I, May 10, 2010.
21) Statement by the Russian Federation, Main Committee I, May 7, 2010.
145OSAKA UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW No. 58 (February 2011)
weapons to include non-strategic nuclear weapons in their general arms control and
disarmament processes, and encouraged the U.S. and Russia to include non-
strategic nuclear weapons in the next round of their bilateral nuclear arms
reductions.22)  Germany, on behalf of the ten European states, strongly argued for
the negotiations on effectively verifiable and legally binding reduction of non-
strategic nuclear weapons in the further arms control and disarmament process.23)
Due to Russian opposition, all these arguments were turned down.  As the 2000
final document included “further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons” under
step 9-3, we find the retrogression in this year’s agreement.  It is recommended that
consultations on non-strategic nuclear weapons be started between NATO and
Russia in order to find equitable measures for both sides, for example, by
discussing the issue in a holistic way by including non-strategic weapons,
conventional weapons, missile defense, and other issues.
IV.  Reduction of the Role of Nuclear Weapons
Nuclear Doctrine
President Obama in his address in Prague in April 2009 emphasized the need to
reduce the role of nuclear weapons in his national security strategy and urged others
to do the same in order to put an end to Cold War thinking.
The ICNND recommended that “Pending the ultimate elimination of nuclear
weapons, every nuclear armed state should make an unequivocal “no first use”
declaration, committing itself to not using nuclear weapons either preventively or
preemptively against any possible nuclear adversary, keeping them available only
for use, or threat of use, by way of retaliation following a nuclear strike against
itself or its allies.  If not prepared at this stage to make such a declaration, every
nuclear armed state should at least accept the principle that the sole purpose of
possessing nuclear weapons is to deter others from using such weapons against that
state or its allies.”  It also recommended that a “sole purpose” statement be made in
the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review due for publication early in 2010.
The phrase “the sole purpose” was intentionally used in the report of the ICNND
in place of “no first use of nuclear weapons” which had been traditionally used but
abandoned due to the cynicism about the Cold War era “no first use“ commitment
of the Soviet Union.
22) NPT/CONF.2010/WP.31 by Spain on behalf of the European Union, April 14, 2010.
23) Statement by Germany on behalf of Austria, Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, and Germany, Main Committee I, May 12, 2010.
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In the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review Report in April 2010, the U.S. concluded
that (i) the U.S. will continue to strengthen conventional capabilities and reduce the
role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks, with the objective of
making deterrence of nuclear attacks on the U.S. or our allies and partners the sole
purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons; (ii) the U.S. would consider the use of nuclear
weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the U.S. or its
allies and partners; and (iii) the U.S. will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons
against non-nuclear-weapon states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with
their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.
The Russian Federation, without supporting the idea of no first use, emphasized
the need for the inclusion of all nuclear-weapons states in the process of nuclear
disarmament, preventing deployment of weapons in outer space, and controlled
cessation of the building of conventional weapons.24)  France explained that its
doctrine is strictly defensive and stringently limits the role of nuclear weapons by
restricting implementation of deterrence to extreme circumstances of self-defence,
but does not support the no first use doctrine.25)
China stated that “Nuclear-weapon states should earnestly reduce the role of
nuclear weapons in their respective national security policy, unequivocally
undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and unconditionally not use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states and nuclear-
weapon-free zones.  We call on all nuclear-weapon states to conclude an
international legal instrument in this regard at an early date.26)”
At the conference, Australia and Japan called on all nuclear possessing states to
commit themselves to reducing the role of nuclear weapons in their national
security strategies, and called on the nuclear-weapon states to take such measures
as providing stronger negative security assurances that they will not use nuclear
weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states that comply with the NPT.
The NAC called upon all nuclear-weapon states, in accordance with their
commitment to diminish the role of nuclear weapons, to reduce their non-nuclear
and nuclear weapons, to encourage states that are part of a regional alliance to
report measures to reduce and eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in collective
security doctrines, to refrain from pursuing military doctrines which emphasize the
importance of nuclear weapons, to consider providing non-nuclear-weapon states
parties to the NPT with legally binding security assurances, and to respect their
24) Statement by the Russian Federation, Main Committee I, May 7, 2010.
25) Statement by France, General Debate, May 4, 2010.
26) Statement by China, General Debate, May 4, 2010.
147OSAKA UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW No. 58 (February 2011)
existing commitment with regard to security assurances.  The NAM called for the
negotiation of a universal, unconditional, and legally binding instrument on security
assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons.
In the context of reducing the role of nuclear weapons, Australia encouraged the
inclusion in any Conference outcome of a commitment to work collectively towards
the interim objective of making nuclear deterrence the sole purpose of nuclear
weapons.27)
The reduction of the role of nuclear weapons was one of the hottest issues at the
conference mainly due to President Obama’s strong initiative and concrete
measures by the U.S. expressed in the Nuclear Posture Review.  Thus, the
conference participants agreed to further diminish the role and significance of
nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines, and policies as
Action 5c.  Though the paragraph of the final document is too abstract to use for
guidance, nuclear-weapon states should take more concrete measures to reduce the
role of nuclear weapons.
Negative Security Assurances
UN Security Council resolution 1887 of September 2009 recalls the statements
by each of the five nuclear-weapon states on negative assurances of May 1995, and
affirms that such security assurances strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation
regime.
The ICNND stated “New and unequivocal negative security assurances (NSAs)
should be given by all the nuclear-armed states, supported by binding Security
Council resolution, that they will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear
weapon states.  The only qualification should be that the assurances would not
extend to a state determined by the Security Council to be in non-compliance with
the NPT to so material an extent as to justify the non-application of any NSA.”
In the Nuclear Posture Review, the U.S concluded that the U.S. will not use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states that are party to
the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations,
strengthening traditional negative security assurances.
Russia consistently stands for an urgent elaboration of an international
convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of
nuclear weapons.28)
27) Statement by Australia, Main Committee I, May 7, 2010.
28) Statement by the Russian Federation, Subsidiary Body I, May 10, 2010.
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China stated “Nuclear-weapon states should unconditionally not use or threaten
to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states.  We call on all nuclear-
weapon states to conclude an international legal instrument in this regard at an early
date.”
Australia and Japan called on the nuclear-weapon states to take such measures
as providing stronger negative security assurances that they will not use nuclear
weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states that comply with the NPT.  The NAC
called for providing non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT with legally
binding security assurances, and respecting fully their existing commitment with
regard to security assurances.  The NAM called for the negotiation of a universal,
unconditional, and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-
nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of nuclear weapons.
The Conference reaffirms and recognizes the legitimate interests of non-nuclear-
weapon states in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances
from nuclear-weapon states, and recalls the unilateral statements and the relevant
protocols to treaties establishing nuclear-weapon free zones.  Under Action 7, all
states agree that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately begin
discussion on this issue, and the Review Conference invites the UN Secretary-
General to convene a high-level meeting in September 2010.
Many states argued for immediate discussion on this issue at the Conference on
Disarmament, but the possibility for the CD to start its activity seems to be low.
Thus, some states including Norway prefer the adoption of a UN Security Council
resolution or a protocol to the NPT as a means to realize stronger negative security
assurances.
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Negative Security Assurances
The UN Security Council resolution 1887 in September 2009 welcomes and
supports the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and reaffirms the
conviction that the establishment enhances global and regional peace and security,
strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and contributes toward realizing
the objectives of nuclear disarmament.
The ICNND recommended that “All NPT nuclear-weapon state members should
sign and ratify the protocols for all the Nuclear Weapon Free Zones, and the other
nuclear-armed states (so long as they remain outside the NPT) should issue stand-
alone negative security assurances for each of them.”
U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton stated “I am announcing we will submit
protocols to the United States Senate to ratify our participation in the nuclear-
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weapon-free-zones that have been established in Africa and the South Pacific.  And
we are prepared to consult with the parties to the nuclear-weapon-free zones in
Central and Southeast Asia, in an effort to reach agreement that would allow us to
sign those protocols as well”29).
Russia expressed the importance of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in
the process of continuously building up the assurance mechanism, stating “We are
ready to assist the states parties of the Semipalatinsk treaty in their dialogue with
nuclear-weapon states on the treaty-related matters.  We expect the remaining
issues under the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone to be
settled as soon as possible through the dialogue between nuclear powers and
ASEAN countries.”
China stated that the nuclear-weapon states should unconditionally not use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons against nuclear-weapon-free zones.
The NAC urged to take all necessary measures to bring about the entry into
force of the relevant protocols and the withdrawal of any related reservations or
unilateral interpretative declarations, as well as encouraged the establishment of
further additional nuclear-weapon-free zones.  The NAM confirmed that the
establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones represents a positive step and an
important measure towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament
and non-proliferation, and urged nuclear-weapon states to modify or withdraw
reservations or unilateral interpretations.
Under Action 9, the establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones is
encouraged.  All concerned states are encouraged to ratify the nuclear-weapon-free
zone treaties and their relevant protocols and to bring about the entry into force of
the relevant legally binding protocols which include negative security assurances.
The concerned states are encouraged to review any related reservations.
The nuclear-weapon states express their constructive attitudes toward the
relevant protocols to the treaty establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones.  The
consultation between the nuclear-weapon states and members of the treaty should
start to constructively resolve outstanding issues.
Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons
The issue of the use of nuclear weapons had not been seriously discussed at the
previous NPT review conferences.  However, at this conference, this issue was
highly debated in relation to the declaratory policy on nuclear weapons, and the
29) Statement by the United States, General Debate, May 3, 2010.
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humanitarian aspect of the use of nuclear weapons was widely discussed.
Switzerland stated that the continued existence of defence policies based on
nuclear weapons only serves to prolong this irresponsible gamble with the future of
humanity.  “Nuclear weapons have no use, they are immoral and illegal.  They are
fundamentally immoral because they are designed to cause massive and
indiscriminate destruction.  They are illegal by their very nature with regard to the
international humanitarian law because they are indiscriminate in their effect, and
their use violates without exception all fundamental principles and rules of
international humanitarian law.”30)
Elements for a Plan of Action for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons
submitted by the NAM demands that nuclear-weapon states eliminate the role of
nuclear weapons in their military and security policies, and elaborate a convention
unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.31)
Action 5d of the final document calls upon nuclear-weapon states to “discuss
policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their
elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war, and contribute to the non-
proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons.  Originally this paragraph dealt
with the declaratory policy to minimize the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
On the humanitarian aspect of nuclear weapons, in paragraph v of A. Principles
and Objectives, the conference expresses its deep concern at the catastrophic
humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, and reaffirms the need
for all states at all times to comply with applicable international law, including
international humanitarian law.
This humanitarian aspect was proposed mainly by Switzerland. With opposition
from some nuclear-weapon states and overwhelming support by non-nuclear-
weapon states in Europe and Latin America, the demand to comply with
international humanitarian law was accepted.  This aspect has not been discussed
widely as a way toward realizing a world without nuclear weapons.  If we take into
consideration the advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice on the
legality of the use of nuclear weapons, this is one of the promising ways toward
achieving nuclear disarmament.
Reduction of the Operational Status of Nuclear Weapons
The ICNND states that “The basic objective is to achieve changes to
30) Statement by Switzerland, General Debate, May 4, 2010.
31) NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47 by Group of the Non-Aligned States Parties to the NPT, May 28,
2010.
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deployment as soon as possible which ensure that, while remaining demonstrably
survivable to a disarming first strike, nuclear forces are not instantly usable.
Stability should be maximized by deployments and launch alert status being
transparent.  It is crucial that ways be found to lengthen the decision-making fuse
for the launch of any nuclear weapons, and in particular that weapons be taken off
launch-on-warning alert as soon as possible.”
The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review concludes that the U.S. will maintain the
current alert posture of U.S. strategic forces, continue the practice of “open-ocean
targeting” of all ICBMs and SLBMs, make new investments in the U.S. command
and control system to maximize presidential decision time in a nuclear crisis, and
explore new modes of ICBM basing that could enhance survivability and further
reduce any incentives for prompt launch.
The Australia-Japan package called on all states possessing nuclear weapons to
take measures to reduce the risk of their accidental or unauthorized launch and to
further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that
promote international stability and security.  The NAC called for further concrete
measures to be taken to decrease the operational readiness of nuclear weapons
systems, with a view to ensuring that all nuclear weapons are removed from high
alert status.
The NAM asked nuclear-weapons states to stand down their nuclear weapon
systems from a state of operational readiness as a measure taken in the first phase
by 2015.  China also called on nuclear-weapon states to take all necessary steps to
avoid accidental or unauthorized launches of nuclear weapons.32)
New Zealand along with Chile, Malaysia, Nigeria, and Switzerland submitted a
working paper for further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons
systems, recommending that the conference (1) recognize that reductions in alert
levels would contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament, (2) urge that further
concrete measures be taken to decrease the operational readiness of nuclear
weapons systems, with a view to ensuring that all nuclear weapons are removed
from high alert status, and (3) call on the nuclear-weapon states to regularly report
on measures taken to lower the operational readiness of their nuclear weapons
systems.
Action 5e of the final document calls on them to “consider the legitimate
interest of non-nuclear weapon states to further reducing the operational status of
nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security,”
32) NPT/CONF.2010/WP.63 by China, May 6, 2010.
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and Action 5f calls on them to “reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear
weapons.”  In spite of the many strong demands by non-nuclear-weapon states to
reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems, the U.S. and Russia
continue to keep many nuclear weapons on high alert status, and they are not likely
to change this posture in the near future.
V.  CTBT and FMCT
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
There has been near consensus among NPT parties to argue for the early entry
into force of the CTBT and the moratorium of nuclear tests ever since the U.S.
administration changed from Bush to Obama, as is evident in the UN Security
Council resolution 1887 of September 2009.
The ICNND recommended that “All states that have not already done so should
sign and ratify the CTBT unconditionally and without delay.  Pending entry into
force, all states should continue to refrain from nuclear testing.  All signatories
should provide the necessary financial, technical and political support for the
continued development and operation of the CTBTO, including completing the
global coverage of its monitoring systems, facilitating on-site inspection when
warranted, and establishing effective national data centres and information
gathering systems.”
The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review clearly states, “The United States will not
conduct nuclear testing, and will pursue ratification and entry into force of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.”
The Australia and Japan proposal urges all states that have not yet done so to
sign and rarify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the earliest
opportunity with a view to its early entry into force, and emphasizes the importance
of maintaining the moratorium on nuclear weapons testing pending the entry into
force of the CTBT.
Almost all states called on these two measures in the review conference.  The
NAM stressed the importance of achieving the entry into force of the CTBT,
requiring its ratification by the remaining Annex 2 states, including in particular
two nuclear-weapon states, and stressed that nuclear-weapon states have a special
responsibility to encourage progress on the entry into force of the CTBT.  The U.S.
has expressed its strong intention to ratify the CTBT, and during the conference
Indonesia expressed its intention to ratify it soon.
The conference recognizes that the test ban constitutes an effective measure of
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nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and reaffirms the vital importance of its
entry into force as well as the determination of the nuclear-weapon states to abide
by their respective moratoria.  Under Action 10, all nuclear-weapon states
undertake to ratify the CTBT, and under Action 11 all states commit to refrain from
nuclear weapon test explosion.  Action 12 recognizes the contribution of the
Conference on Facilitating the Entry-into-Force of the CTBT.  Under Action 13
ratifying states undertake to promote its entry into force, and under Action 14 the
CTBTO Preparatory Commission is encouraged to develop the CTBT verification
regime.
Compared with the 2000 final document which provided for the importance and
urgency of its signatures and ratifications, and a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-
test explosions, the current Final Document includes many other aspects such as the
contribution of the Conference on Facilitating its Entry-into-Force, the role of
ratifying states, and the CTBTO Preparatory Commission.  However, the
fundamental recommendations are almost the same although the current one
includes technical aspects of the CTBT.
Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT)
The ICNND recommended negotiating to an early conclusion in the Conference
on Disarmament an FMCT banning the production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.  It also recommended that all nuclear-
armed states should declare or maintain a moratorium on the production of fissile
material for weapon purposes pending the entry into force of such a treaty.
The U.S., under the Nuclear Posture Review, seeks commencement of
negotiations on a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) to halt the
production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.
Australia and Japan called for the immediate commencement and early
conclusion of negotiations on an FMCT, while urging all states possessing nuclear
weapons to declare and maintain the moratorium on the production of fissile
material for weapons purposes.  The NAC reiterated the necessity of negotiations in
the CD on an FMCT, and the NAM asked CD members to agree on a program of
work for the CD that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on an
FMCT with a view to its conclusion within five years.
The first draft included “Action 18: All states undertake to seek a global
moratorium on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons” and
“Action 19: The nuclear-weapon states undertake to declare all weapon-usable
fissile material stocks by 2012.”  Action 19 was immediately deleted and there was
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no mention of it in the second draft due to strong opposition by the nuclear-weapon
states.  The second draft included a softer expression of Action 18 as follows,
“Action 18: All states recognize that a global moratorium on the production of
missile material for use in nuclear weapons would constitute an important
contribution to achieving the goals of the Treaty, and all nuclear-weapon states
should uphold or consider declaring a moratorium.”  However, China strongly
opposed this paragraph and it was deleted.  As a result, there is no provision for the
moratorium.
Under Action 15, all states agree that the Conference on Disarmament should
immediately begin negotiations of an FMCT, and the Review Conference invited
the UN Secretary-General to convene a high-level meeting in September 2010.  As
the 2000 Final Document recommended negotiating such a treaty “with a view to
their conclusion within five years,” the new agreement was weaker.  In addition,
some states, including Canada, suggested negotiating it in a different forum than the
CD.
Excessive Fissile Material
The ICNND states “On the question of pre-existing stocks, a phased approach
should be adopted, with the first priority a cap on production; then an effort to
ensure that all fissile material other than in weapons becomes subject to
irreversible, verified non-explosive use commitments; and with fissile material
released through dismantlement being brought under these commitments as
weapons reduction are agreed.  As an interim step, all nuclear-armed states should
voluntarily declare their fissile material stocks and the amount they regard as excess
to their weapons needs, place such excess material under IAEA safeguards as soon
as practicable, and convert it as soon as possible into forms that cannot be used for
nuclear weapons”.
The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review mentions “working with the Russian
Federation to jointly eliminate 68 tons of weapons-grade plutonium no longer
needed for defense purposes”.
Australia and Japan urged all states possessing nuclear weapons to declare
voluntarily fissile material that is no longer required for military purposes and to
place such material under IAEA safeguards or other relevant international
verifications.  The NAC stressed the need for all five nuclear-weapon states to
make arrangements for the placing of their fissile material no longer required for
military purposes under IAEA or another relevant international verification and to
make arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, as
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well as to support the development of appropriate legally binding verification
arrangements to ensure the irreversible removal.  The NAM also argued for placing
fissile material transferred from military to peaceful purposes under IAEA
safeguards.
Action 16 encourages the nuclear-weapon states to declare to the IAEA all
excessive fissile material and to place such material under IAEA safeguards, Action
17 encourages all states to develop legally binding verification arrangements, and
Action 18 encourages the dismantling or converting for peaceful purposes facilities
used for its production.
As the 2000 agreement recommended placing excessive fissile material under
IAEA safeguards and disposing of it for peaceful purposes, this new agreement is
almost the same as the old one though it includes new technical measures such as
the development of a legally binding verification arrangement and dismantling of
facilities used to produce fissile material.
VI.  Conclusion: What to Do
The current positive trend toward nuclear disarmament prompted by the strong
leadership of President Obama and supported by the cooperative attitude of many
states should be praised.  However, there is no guarantee that this positive trend will
last forever.  We have to seize this opportunity to make the world more peaceful
and secure through these efforts to realize a world without nuclear weapons.  In
order to proceed in this direction, we must take the following measures as soon as
possible.
First, discussions on a nuclear weapons convention should be held not only
among scholars and NGOs but among states, including the nuclear-weapon states.
The basis of discussion could be the existing model nuclear weapons convention
that has been proposed by the NGOs.  It is much better to think of each concrete
nuclear disarmament measure in the framework of a nuclear weapons convention
than to think of each measure independently of a whole framework.
It may be difficult to set a rigid timetable for the entire process of nuclear
weapon elimination from the beginning.  We may only have a rigid timetable for
measures taken in the first stage of the whole long process.
Second, the U.S. and Russia should work hard to ratify and implement the New
START Treaty as soon as possible and swiftly move on to the next stage of
negotiation between them to further reduce the number of deployed strategic
nuclear warheads to 1000 each.  By resetting their relations with the signing of the
New START Treaty, it would not seem to be very difficult for the two counties to
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negotiate and conclude a treaty in the current international security environment.
Third, the United States, in consultation with NATO members, should begin
negotiations to reduce non-strategic nuclear weapons stationed in NATO countries
and Russia.  In order to invite Russia to this negotiation, the U.S. should include the
issues of missile defense and conventional arms in the negotiation. Both countries
should work hard to strengthen the possibility of cooperation in missile defense.
Some NATO states in whose territory U.S. nuclear weapons are deployed are
arguing for the withdrawal of these nuclear weapons to the U.S. homeland.  After
consultation among NATO members, these non-strategic nuclear weapons should
be reduced or consolidated.
Fourth, the nuclear-weapon states should rethink their nuclear doctrines with the
aim of further restricting the use of nuclear weapons and reducing the salience of
nuclear weapons in their security strategy.  The first step is to adopt the “sole
purpose” doctrine, that is, to declare that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is to
deter a nuclear attack from others.  Then, nuclear possessing states should make a
pledge to each other of “no first use” of nuclear weapons.
Fifth, negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states should be given
more clearly and should exclude calculated ambiguity.  Legally binding negative
security assurances given through a protocol to the treaties establishing nuclear-
weapon-free zones should be completely implemented.  Nuclear-weapon states that
have not ratified a protocol should do so as soon as possible.  In the cases of
nuclear-weapon-free zones in Southeast Asia and Central Asia, the dispute between
the zonal states and the nuclear-weapon states prevents the nuclear-weapon states
from signing and ratifying the protocol.  They should begin consultations to resolve
pending issues and proceed to the signature and ratification of the protocol.
Sixth, as the NPT review conference emphasized the importance of international
humanitarian law, all states should work towards achieving the prohibition of the
use of nuclear weapons, including the discussion or negotiation of a convention
prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, based on the Advisory Opinion of the
International Court of Justice in July 1996.
Seventh, in order to prevent an unauthorized or accidental launch of nuclear
missiles, the U.S. and Russia should start consultations to reduce the high alert
status of missiles or de-alert them through confidence-building measures.
Eighth, the U.S. should make efforts to ratify the CTBT as soon as possible, and
China should follow suit.  Then the five nuclear-weapon states should persuade or
pressure the remaining nuclear possessing states, that is, India, Pakistan, Israel, and
North Korea to sign and ratify the CTBT.
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Finally, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva should begin negotiating an
FMCT in the 2011 sessions.  If they cannot agree on the negotiation until the end of
the 2011 sessions, another forum for its negotiation should be pursued by those
states arguing for the case.
These are the measures which should and could be taken now to make progress
toward a more peaceful and secure world through nuclear disarmament.
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